It's Reasonable to Defend Marriage

Bumping this up from May 2013:

Amy Hall at Stand to Reason blogged around the SCOTUS hearing on the marriage cases. She pointed out that "It's Not About Equality":

The term “marriage equality,” if it means “the right to marry whomever you want,” is simply not an accurate term for what same-sex marriage supporters are advocating—not if they favor any restrictions whatsoever (age, number of people, incest, etc.). The truth is that nearly everyone does favor a definition of marriage that has boundaries and thereby denies “marriage equality” to some category of couple (or group).

As you’re likely to hear this term often this week while the Supreme Court is reviewing Prop 8, below is a reposting of “We’re Arguing Definitions, Not Rights” that can help you move your conversations past the charge that you want to deny people equal rights to the real question: What is marriage?

And for a collection of links to more posts and resources discussing this issue, see “Three-Judge Panel Strikes Down Prop 8.”

From "We're Arguing Definitions, Not Rights:

1. Nearly everyone who thinks the government ought to issue marriage licenses favors defining marriage in some way. That is, they favor excluding some combinations of people (polygamy, incest, etc.), not individuals, from the definition. Even judges. Even you!

All laws discriminate between behavior and/or limit the definition of something.

2. You can't consistently argue that by excluding certain combinations of people, traditional marriage violates equal rights—unless you also argue to remove every single boundary from the definition of marriage and say anyone can marry anyone, in whatever combination of numbers they like.

If the argument is consenting adults have the right to get "marriage" licenses with anyone they want to, then yes, all restrictions on adult relationships would have to be dropped to include everyone.

3. If you're not willing to argue this, then you're for having a definition with boundaries, which puts you on equal footing with the traditional marriage supporters.

4. So the question is, which definition should we use? It's fine for you to argue that your definition of "two people who love each other" is better than my definition of "one man, one woman," or someone else's definition of "one man, multiple women," but we need to start off by understanding that we're arguing definitions, not rights.

Precisely. Everyone has the same rights now. Everyone would have the same rights if licensing is neutered.

It's not unconstitutional to adopt either my or your definition, as long as it's applied equally to every individual. Remember that the Constitution doesn't recognize rights for combinations of people; rights only belong to individuals.

That's a very important point.

So one can't say that a man and five women have a right to get married; one can only say that each individual man or woman has the right to enter into marriage (no individual is excluded). This right is then acted upon according to the boundaries set by the state's definition of what marriage is—boundaries which are equally applied to every individual. You would like to equally apply the boundary of "two people who love each other" (excluding some other combinations), and I would like to apply the boundary of "one man, one woman" to each individual equally.

Later, she wrote Now We Wait for the Ruling

Over at First Things, Glenn Stanton comments on some good questions the Justices asked. I tracked down one of the quotes he cited from Justice Sotomayor to get more of the context:

SOTOMAYOR: Mr. Olson, the bottom line that you're being asked—and it is one that I'm interested in the answer: If you say that marriage is a fundamental right, what state restrictions could ever exist? Meaning, what state restrictions with respect to the number of people…the incest laws, the mother and child…I can accept that the state has probably an overbearing interest on protecting a child until they're of age to marry, but what's left?

OLSON: Well, you've said in the cases decided by this court that the polygamy issue, multiple marriages, raises questions about exploitation, abuse, patriarchy, issues with respect to taxes, inheritance, child custody, it is an entirely different thing. And if you—if a state prohibits polygamy, it's prohibiting conduct. If it prohibits gay and lesbian citizens from getting married, it is prohibiting their exercise of a right based upon their status.

The first mistake Olson makes here is that he thinks people are being denied marriage because of their sexual orientation (i.e., “their status”). This has never happened. There is no test whatsoever for sexual orientation when a person applies for a marriage license. There is no class of people being told they’re not eligible for marriage. In fact, the exclusion of same-sex couples (that’s same-sex couples, not homosexual citizens) from marriage isn’t about prohibiting something on the basis of bad conduct or the status of a group, it’s about the definition of marriage.

Marriage was not something developed to make homosexual people sad.

If marriage is a particular thing, then everyone has a right to take part in that institution as it stands, regardless of their personal characteristics. But to be part of the institution, they must be part of the institution. They don’t have a right to change that institution into something different simply because they don’t want to be part of it the way it is.

Imagine a public park builds a tennis court so that people can come to play tennis. Nobody should be denied the right to play tennis games there. Period. It’s a public park, open to all. One day, a group of basketball players comes to the park, wanting to play a game, but they find they can’t play basketball on a tennis court. They immediately go to City Hall to complain: “Everyone has the right to competitive exercise with a ball on that court! We’re being denied our rights based on our status as basketball players!” Can you see the problem? The fact that they don’t want to play tennis doesn’t give them the right to demand that the government build a different court at the park. Their right isn’t to “competitive exercise with a ball” (tennis shares that in common with basketball, but it can’t be reduced to that), their right is to play tennis on that court, just like everybody else.

Or, as I like to say, a chess club has no right to demand status as an NFL team, requiring that the NFL sanction chess-playing. Football is not chess.